Sean McVay Offensive Scheme Study

A study on the Rams 2017-2020 offense. For my coding development timeline, this was when I just started gaining more momentum using ggplot2 and R during 2020.

Introduction

This project was created to display my ability to use tape study, data (sourced from Next Gen Stats player tracking data & PFF Ultimate), and quotes from Rams’ coaches & player personnel staff to develop a deeper understanding of the Los Angeles Rams’ offensive and defensive schemes to identify what traits the Rams value at each position. 

Environment and scheme fit are highly correlated to how successful a player will be when transitioning to a new team, whether that’s from college via the draft or from another NFL organization via free agency or trade. It’s important to understand the scheme that the player being evaluated will be asked to perform in. In that way it’s important to be able to evaluate talent from both a scout and coach’s perspective. 

If I were evaluating players for an NFL franchise I’d consistently remind myself of a few things. What type of players perform well in our scheme? What type of players do not perform well in our scheme? And which positions do we consistently miss on and how can we improve in that area through player evaluation and player development?

Offensive Scheme Overview

Since Sean McVay became the Rams head coach in 2017, Los Angeles has averaged 5.8 yards per play (5th) and scored 1,086 points on offense (tied 6th). McVay’s offensive scheme is one of the most efficient and difficult schemes to prepare for due to his play sequencing and ability to run different play calls from the same look. Each play works off one another to setup the next one to keep the defense guessing. With that in mind it’s important to not evaluate plays in a vacuum and evaluate the series in which they are used.

Expected Points Added (EPA) is a football statistic that seeks to measure the value of individual plays in terms of points. This is done by calculating the Expected Points (EP) of the down, distance, and field position situation at the start of a play and contrasting it with the situation at the end of the play.

The key play in which McVay’s scheme is centered around is the outside zone run play. The Rams have used outside zone on 39.8% of run plays since 2017 (1st). The outside zone run stretches the defense horizontally to find a gap in the defense to run through. On it’s own the outside zone run a solid play, but what makes the entire scheme effective is the additional elements an offense can attach to the play that helps deceive the defense (jet motion, play-action, screens, etc.).

Outside Zone Play Example (Credit: Seth Galina)

Outside Zone & Personnel Groupings (11 & 12 Personnel)

The Outside Zone Scheme originated out of Mike Shanahan’s offense in the mid-1980’s when he was the Offensive Coordinator for the Denver Broncos. It took Shanahan a few seasons and organizations (Broncos OC: 1985-1987, Raiders HC: 1988-1989, Broncos OC: 1991, 49ers OC: 1992-1994) before he made the outside zone run the base play for his offense as the Broncos  HC (1995-2008) with Alex Gibbs and Gary Kubiak on his staff.

Mike Shanahan used a true single-back formation when running outside zone, but members of his coaching tree like, Kyle Shanahan and Kubiak have adapted the scheme to incorporate a fullback. Which is to say that outside zone can be run from many different personnel groupings. 

The outside zone run scheme is versatile in that it doesn’t matter whether the offense running the scheme uses 11, 12, 21, or 22 personnel. Other outside zone heavy teams like the 49ers (21 personnel), Titans (12 & 21 personnel), and Browns (12 & 13 personnel) have been successful using different types of personnel based on the talent available on their roster. The only prerequisites are the need for the involvement of a TE and the ability to run to the weak side or strong side of the defense. This is usually done with 2 TE personnel as teams can put a TE to each side of the formation. However, teams that use 21 personnel can align the fullback to the opposite side of the formation from the TE.

The Rams have used 11 personnel on 76.7% of plays (1st) and have 471 outside zone runs (1st) from 11 personnel since McVay became the team’s head coach in 2017.

McVay likes to condense his receiver’s splits and align them tight from 11 personnel. The condensed formation helps aid the outside zone scheme as it allows for the running back to get to the edge faster. This heat map using Next Gen Stats player tracking data displays how the Rams’ wide receivers align “tight” to the formation. This is shown by the pockets of yellow and red    areas (indicating a player aligns in that location more often) near the ball (0 on the X-axis).

Tight splits are part of the reason why bigger slot receivers who can block, like Cooper Kupp (6015, 204 lbs — source NFL Combine),  have been successful in McVay’s offense. These types of players essentially function as quasi-tight ends. Although players like Robert Woods, who may not have as large a frame as Kupp, can still have success aligned tight in this offense by displaying high levels of competitive toughness, a willingness to block, and possessing functional play strength.

Condensing the formation gives the offense additional benefits in the passing game too. It often allows receivers to get a free release and not face jams when pressed at the line of scrimmage. This helps in an offense where crossing routes are as prevalent as they are in McVay’s. Additionally bunching receivers in tight to the formation creates rub routes and natural picks against man coverage and can cause confusion for coverage defenders in regards to their responsibilities. The Rams used a bunch set on 60.7% of 11 personnel plays since 2017 (1st).

While the Rams still used 11 personnel on 64.4% of their offensive plays in 2020, this figure is much lower than the team’s 81.0% 11 personnel rate in McVay’s first three seasons as head coach. The dip in 11 personnel usage can be attributed to the increase in 12 personnel usage. The Rams used 12 personnel on 30.1% of offensive plays in 2020 (3rd)

.In fact, the trend dates back to the 2019 season. After the Rams Week 9 bye in 2019 the team began utilizing the 2-TE grouping to diversify the offense and keep things fresh. Since their Week 9 bye in 2019, the Rams saw its 11 personnel usage drop to 64.6% (13th) and its 12 personnel usage increase to 30.7% (5th). Prior to Week 10, 2019, the Rams used 12 personnel on just 9.4% of offensive plays since McVay became the team’s head coach (32nd). Eighty-five of the Rams 174 outside zone runs from 12 personnel since 2017 happened in 2020.   

Play-Action (Boot-Action)

Once the opposing defense’s linebackers begin to flow hard to the sideline to defend the outside zone run, McVay likes to call play-action bootlegs to the opposite direction to deceive the defense. The Rams have used play-action on 32.7% of dropbacks since 2017 (1st) and have the most play-action attempts off the outside zone concept in that time frame (271 play-action attempts off outside zone, 50 more than the next closest team).

Since 2017, the Rams have run a play-action rollout on 287 offensive plays (1st) with 142  of those plays attaching an outside zone concept to add to the deception (1st).

Adding more to the deception is how the Rams align quarterback Jared Goff under center to make the outside zone run and play-action bootleg look identical until the fake handoff — the Rams have aligned under center on 58.4% of offensive plays since 2017 (1st). The two key elements to a successful play-action pass is the offensive line flow to replicate their actions as if they’re running an actual run play and the handoff. 

In The Art of Quarterbacking by Ken Anderson, the Bengals franchise leader in passing yards said, “The quarterback actually must stick the ball in front of the runner’s pocket with the same motion that he uses on all of his handoffs, and he must allow the defense to see it heading there, before he pulls it back. This is an art and it requires a lot of work, plus the coordination of both the runner and the offensive line.”

Outside Zone Run Play 

Play-Action off Outside Zone Run Concept

Broadcast SkyCam Angle of Play-Action

Shift/Motion & Jet Motion

McVay’s use of shifts and motions prior to and at the snap add another level of deception to his play calls. The Rams have used a shift or motion on 52.4% of offensive plays since 2017  (7th).

Shifts allow offenses to flip the strength prior to the snap which can cause safeties to rotate and cause miscommunication in the opposing defense’s secondary. Motion can be a valuable tool for a quarterback as it acts as a pre-snap indicator to determine if a defense is playing man or zone coverage.

Additionally, jet motion creates conflict and disrupts defensive run fits at the snap. It messes with defender’s eye discipline and causes them to move out of position. The Rams used jet motion on 443 offensive plays since 2019 (2nd), attaching them to 267 runs (2nd) and 176 passes (2nd). 

At one point, however, more disciplined defenses stopped flowing to the man in motion as they determined it was only a tactic to mess with their eyes. One way McVay forces defenses to respect the pre-snap jet motion is to give the ball to the man in motion.

The Rams have led the NFL in giving the ball to the man in motion the last two seasons (2019: 31 plays; 2020: 37 plays). The Rams increased the deception for run plays by handing the ball off to the motion man on 23 plays this season, an increase of 11 more rushes for the man in motion from 2019.

Robert Woods has been put in jet motion on 218 plays since 2019 (1st, no other player has more than 165 such plays) and has been the ball carrier or target on 46 of those plays (1st) — 24 runs, 22 targets. Woods has gained 353 scrimmage yards as the ball carrier after being put in jet motion (1st) since 2019 with 180 rushing yards and 173 receiving yards (167 of those yards coming on play-action targets).

One effective play call for the Rams that ties a lot of the elements of this offense together is the Jet Motion Play-Action Screen. The play usually begins by Jared Goff motioning Woods across the formation, faking the handoff to the RB, and then having Goff eye the backside of the play to manipulate the coverage before turning his body to throw back to Woods. Woods has 69 yards (2nd) on 10 receptions (1st) for 5 first downs (1st) on such targets since 2019.

Another element of making opposing defenses respect the man in motion is motioning the receiver to the play side of the run to give the offense an additional blocker and a numbers advantage in the running game. Here’s an example against the Chicago Bears with 11:30 remaining in the 1st quarter of Week 7, 2020. It’s 1st & 10 for the Rams on their own 10-yard line.

The Rams align in 12 personnel with 2 tight ends to the strong side — creating additional run gaps to defend — and Woods and Kupp aligned tight to the weak side. The Bears are aligned in a 3-4 Over front with the 3-technique aligned on the outside shoulder of the offensive guard on the strong side, and the backside defensive tackle aligned on the outside shoulder of the center.  The Rams face a six man box with the Sam linebacker slightly outside the box.

Goff motions Woods across the formation and the linebackers do not move out of position, but the deepest safety spins down toward the line of scrimmage. Woods is now an additional blocker to the strong side to take on the outside cornerback. The play results in a 1st down for a gain of 11 yards.

Yards After the Catch

Another important element of McVay’s offense is Yards After the Catch. Whether it’s schemed up by spacing, the player’s individual YAC ability, or a combination of both, running backs, wide receivers, and tight ends on the Rams need to be able to create after the catch.

The Rams averaged 6.0 yards after the catch per reception since 2017, the third most in that span only behind the 49ers and Chiefs. Los Angeles also averaged 2.7 yards after  contact per reception (6th) and 0.15 missed tackles forced per reception (3rd) since 2017.

The Rams offense is based on distributing the ball to their playmakers near the line of scrimmage. Goff averaged just 6.5 air yards per attempt in 2020 — the 3rd-fewest in the NFL. However, 56.0% of Goff’s passing yards came from YAC this season — the 3rd-highest percentage among qualified quarterbacks.

How Opposing Teams Defend Coach McVay’s Scheme & How He Adjusts

Since Super Bowl LIII opposing defenses began showing more two-high and Middle of Field Open coverages against McVay’s offense. From Week 1, 2018 up to the Conference Championship against the New Orleans Saints opposing defenses used Middle of Field Open on 30.6% of defensive snaps vs the Rams. That percentage increased to 36.0% since Super Bowl LIII through the 2020 regular season.

McVay’s scheme took advantage of the Middle of Field Closed, Cover 1 and Cover 3 defensive philosophy permeating throughout the NFL by using play-action and deep crossing routes over the middle of the field. With only one high safety to defend the deep middle of the field it became difficult for defenses to cut off the crossing route.

In McVay’s first two seasons as the Rams head coach no team targeted more crossing routes of 18+ air yards downfield (33). The Rams used play-action on 27 of those 33 “deep” crossing route targets (1st) in that span — coaching point on HI Cross is for the receiver to get 18-22 yards of depth between the numbers and the hashes.

The coverage blueprint to stalling the Rams offense was actually implemented by the Chicago Bears and their Defensive Coordinator at the time Vic Fangio (along with the 2020 Rams’ Defensive Coordinator Brandon Staley as the OLB coach) in Week 14, 2018. The Bears used quarters on 11 defensive snaps and Cover 6 on 12 defensive snaps against the Rams. Both types of coverages were either the most or tied for the most against the Rams throughout the entire 2018 season, including the playoffs. The Bears are also credited for not taking the bait on the jet motion and not being manipulated by Goff’s play-action fakes.

One way to beat Cover 4 is the Post-In “PIN” also sometimes referred to as the Mills concept. In Cover 4 the outside cornerbacks play with outside leverage and are responsible for a 1/4th of the deep portion of the field. The concept attacks the cornerback’s outside leverage with the post route as the wide receiver will have the leverage to break inside. The receiver can create even more separation by stemming his route to the corner before breaking to the post (Dino stem). The In route part of the concept forces the safety to drive down underneath which allows the receiver running the post to not have to worry about the outside cornerback having any inside help.

The following play example isn’t exactly a Mills concept (Post and dig route on same side of field) or a Cross Country Mills (Post with dig route on the opposite side of the field), but it has a similar concept behind it. It’s actually more like what some coaches call a “Jalapeño”  concept — a double post to one side with a deep cross to the other.

The Seahawks are in a two-high structure and their cornerbacks are playing with outside leverage prior to the snap. Kupp releases from the slot and works inside the hashes attacking the safety Quandre Diggs’ area of the field. He stems to the corner which turns Diggs to the sideline before he breaks to the post. The crossing route run by Josh Reynolds frees up Kupp as the other deep safety, Jamal Adams, drives down on the crosser. This leaves Kupp with plenty of separation as  the crossing route eliminated inside help for Goff to make the easy 31-yard completion

The other adjustment defenses made to the Rams offense based on Super Bowl LIII is how they defended the run. The Patriots used a 6-1 Front with the idea being to constrict the outside zone run game and have overhang defenders to guard against the jet motion to either side. If you take a look at the following heat maps, there is more of an emphasis on playing wider and adding defenders along the line of scrimmage in the “Since Super Bowl LIII” heat map than the “Before Super Bowl LIII” heat map.   

The 6-1 front and the variations teams used to copy it was effective at stalling the Rams run game for a portion of the 2019 season, but McVay created a sound solution to stop this scheme while not abandoning the play at the center of the his offense’s identity. His adjustment was to vary his run calls by using more downhill rushing concepts to complement outside zone runs. Just as the Rams varied their personnel after their Week 9 bye in 2019, they also increased the percentage of Man rushing concepts. PFF classifies man rushing concepts as Duo and Iso  runs. Both of which get the offensive line working vertically upfield. 

 The Rams increased their man rushing usage from 15.4% in 2017 up until their Week 9 bye in 2019 (15th) to 28.0% from Weeks 10, 2019 to the end of the 2020 regular season (3rd). The Rams also used more counter run concepts in 2020 (19) than in McVay’s first three seasons combined (14). And as stated earlier, the increase in man rushing concepts did not have an impact on the percentage of outside zone rushes as the Rams utilized outside zone runs on   41.8%  of carries since Week 10, 2019 (2nd).

Sources

Data:

Next Gen Stats

PFF

Articles:

https://www.pff.com/news/nfl-new-nfl-offense-49ers-titans-packers-mike-shanahan-offense

https://touchdownwire.usatoday.com/lists/nfls-best-offensive-play-callers-kyle-shanahan-matt-lafleur-josh-mcdaniels-arthur-smith

Books:

The Art of Quarterbacking by Ken Anderson